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Memory Politics at Work in a Gyalrong Revolt in the Early Twentieth Century 
 
Jinba Tenzin, National University of Singapore 
 
Abstract 
 
A 1917 uprising led by Zöpa, a low-ranking monk who proclaimed himself emperor, attracted 
over four thousand participants in the Gyalrong region on the southeastern edge of the Tibetan 
Plateau. Some of the uprising’s agendas and goals contradicted one another. It targeted the Han 
with the shout of “Crush the Great Han,” even though Zöpa’s two main henchmen were Han. It 
evoked the support of a wider Gyalrong community and claimed to avenge Qing oppression 
(since the Jinchuan campaigns of the eighteenth century) while attempting to establish a Qing-
branded kingdom. Also, this revolt targeted foreign intrusion, as evidenced by the burning of a 
Catholic church in Danba. This article offers a glimpse into how this uprising was embedded in 
sociopolitical changes during a critical transitional period from the Qing to the Republic in 
Sichuan’s Sino-Tibetan borderlands. It particularly examines how memories of the Qing’s 
atrocities and subsequent reforms, as well as of the “golden past” of Gyalrong, catalyzed ethnic 
and religious tensions. Above all, this study exemplifies the significance of integrating historical 
analyses with ethnographic investigations by examining the ways in which written documents 
and oral histories constitute competing yet complementary interpretive narratives about 
sociopolitical changes. 
 
Keywords: ethnicity, religion, memory, Jinchuan campaigns, Gyalrong 
 
Led by Tsatö Zöpa (hereafter Zöpa), a low-ranking monk from a local monastery, a revolt broke 
out in 1917 in Bajiao,1 Maogong County, in the Gyalrong region2 of Sichuan’s Sino-Tibetan 
borderlands (see map 1). This uprising attracted over four thousand participants and led to the 
seizure of several neighboring counties and magistratures (C. tun, lit. “troops station,” a military-
civil administrative unit of the Qing) within a few months. Arguably, this short-lived rebellion 
was the largest of its kind in Gyalrong against the Manchu/Chinese state since the two Jinchuan 
campaigns (1747–1749, 1771–1776), the costliest wars against rebellious chieftains in Qing 
history. These campaigns were part of the Qing’s grand design of expansion to keep Gyalrong, 
Kham, and southwestern China under its direct administration. 
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 This article provides a window onto the sociopolitical contexts in China, and in the 
Gyalrong region in particular, during the transitional period from the Qing to the Republic in the 
early twentieth century. These years were characterized by unprecedented political chaos and 
uncertainties. I investigate how religious and ethnic tensions in Gyalrong were evoked and 
intensified through reanimated memories of Qing atrocities (e.g., slaughter) against Gyalrong 
rebels. I also examine how such tensions and memories were implicated in subsequent reforms 
after the rebels, such as “substituting chieftains with state-appointed civilian officials” (gaitu 
guiliu) and the radical reforms by Zhao Erfeng (a former Sichuan-Yunnan frontier minister of the 
Qing) in Sichuan’s Sino-Tibetan borderlands (see Relyea in this issue). 
 
 
 
Map 1. Bajiao and Maogong in Gyalrong in the early twentieth century. Source: Created by 
Tenzin Jinba and Rémi Chaix, based on data from NASA’s Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 
(SRTM). 
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 Memory politics—or, specifically, memory as an ideological and political instrument—
thus comprises my key angle of analysis in this article. This work is informed by theoretical 
insights that identify memory as a synthetic and multivalent ongoing dynamic political process 
linking the past, present, and future.3 It focuses, however, on how an ethnographic approach and 
recounted memories collected in the field enable more effective engagement with documented 
historical data. Hence, building on both archival research and fieldwork, this article contributes 
to enhanced initiatives in anthropology, history, and other disciplines that aim to advance 
synthetic analyses of documented local history and culture with field observations and 
ethnographic interpretations of locals’ memories and other collected field data (see, for instance, 
Faure and Ho 2013, xii, and Gros in this issue). 
 The archives are made up of two major series. The first series was collected in the 1950s 
by the newly founded Southwest Nationalities Institute (Xinan minzu xueyuan) (1954) and by 
the Office of the Xiaojin County Party Committee (Xiaojin xianwei ban’gongshi) (1959). The 
second series was compiled in the 1980s. At that time, investigations were organized by the 
county’s Political Consultative Conference (Zhengxie) (1985) and by the Gazette Office 
(Xianzhiban) (1987). However, these officially classified “archives” (dang’an) are often 
unsatisfactory, informed as they are by grand narratives with inadequate attention to local social 
complexities. Also, the accounts reveal the party-state’s orchestrated agenda of labeling the 
revolt as a class-conscious “people’s uprising” against repressive feudal lords. Therefore, I find 
that a more complete understanding of the 1917 revolt can only be gained by investigating more 
nuanced local perspectives. 
 As a result, I conducted fieldwork in Xiaojin County from December 2014 to February 
2015. This was mainly in Bajiao and neighboring Mupo, the hubs of the 1917 uprising. I 
conducted intensive interviews with more than twenty individuals whose average age was over 
sixty-five. I also had many informal conversations with other local people of different ages, 
genders, and social statuses (monks, retired cadres, and villagers). These informants’ accounts 
were based on their elder relatives’ experiences. They illuminated previous omissions, including 
the source of ethnic tension and anti-missionary sentiment. Although most of these contemporary 
oral accounts are consistent with the existing archives, some of them contradict one another or 
are flawed in terms of historical rigor. Nevertheless, I argue in the following sections that factual 
errors do not conceal or undermine the historical veracity or symbolic value of the accounts. 
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 These findings demonstrate how we can use and interpret ethnographic oral data for 
analytical purposes, beyond critiques of textual authenticity. In so doing, this study not only 
explores how written documents and oral histories constitute competing yet complementary 
interpretive narratives about sociopolitical changes, but also exemplifies the significance of 
integrating historical analysis with ethnographic investigation. 
 
The Uprising: Rise and Fall 
 The occurrence and evolution of the Bajiao uprising were implicated in, and also 
epitomized, dramatic political changes and ensuing chaos in China and in this particular Sino-
Tibetan borderland during the early twentieth century. As the 1911 revolution brought Qing rule 
to an end, China’s political future was full of uncertainties. Foreign powers were increasingly 
encroaching. Also, heightened polarization and reconstitution of old and new political forces and 
regimes emerged at both the national and local (provincial and subregional) levels. In Sichuan 
proper, warlords of different factions had been vying for control of the province. They would 
soon become embroiled in battles against the Yunnan and Guizhou warlords who had invaded 
Sichuan in 1916. Interminable warfare and exorbitant extortion of taxes and labor for military 
expenditures intensified Sichuan locals’ afflictions from both sides. 
 Gyalrong and Kham chieftains, nobles, and local populations still had fresh memories of 
the cruel measures of Zhao Erfeng against local chieftains and nobles who opposed his reforms 
(1906–1911). With these reforms, their territories were to be directly administered by the court.4 
Thus, in assessing the fluctuating situation cautiously, chieftains and nobles wished to hold on to 
their remaining territory and power, if not to regain and expand their influence. To achieve that 
goal, they had to reconfigure their relationship with (and defend their own interests against) Han 
administrators, militia, gangs, and an increasing number of immigrant war refugees. As a 
consequence, different forces and factions in Maogong bargained and contended with one 
another in service of their own interests. 
 A notable political development in China following the demise of the Qing was that Yuan 
Shikai started to pave the way to becoming an absolute dictator and, indeed, a new emperor. 
Yuan, who had been a leading Han imperial official of the Qing, seized on the fruits of the 1911 
revolution to become the president of the new republic. To fulfill this great ambition, Yuan 
dismissed the Kuomingtang party, disbanded elected assemblies, and eventually proclaimed the 
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revival of the imperial monarchy in December 1915. However, he was forced to declare a return 
to the Republican presidency in March 1916 due to growing opposition from both domestic 
forces (the rivals, revolutionaries, and general public, as well as his own cabinet and allies) and 
foreign powers (Japan, Britain, and others). Yuan died in June 1916, probably from all the 
pressures and frustrations he faced.5 Nevertheless, dreams of restoring the Qing did not die with 
him. 
 Many previous members of the Qing elite as well as commoners continued to advocate 
for the revival of the Qing or a similar imperial system. Besides the fact that some of them were 
nostalgic about the old system, their backing of the Qing largely resulted from their resentment 
of the chaotic situation under Yuan’s rule. This chaos was highlighted by Japan’s encroachment 
on Chinese territory and sovereignty, constant civil strife, and a stagnant economy. The situation 
worsened after Yuan’s death, as the absence of a strong leader gave rise to more turmoil and 
unrest. A number of greater and lesser warlords fought fiercely against one another for control 
over territories and resources. Consequently, for some people in Gyalrong and Sichuan, as in 
other parts of China, the old imperial system seemed a better alternative to Republicanism. 
 The Gyalrong uprising was merely one of many restoration attempts in the Sino-Tibetan 
borderlands (e.g., Gansu and Qinghai) and throughout the country, and different classes and 
multiple peoples (such as the Han, Manchu, Tibetans, Mongols, Hui, and many others) became 
involved.6 These revolts and ventures soon reached a climax when General Zhang Xun, Yuan’s 
follower, proclaimed the restoration of abdicated Qing emperor Puyi on July 1, 1917.7 
 Zöpa’s main Han associates and other Han participants were surely among those who 
missed the “good old days.” Dissatisfied with the ongoing chaos, they dreamed of restoring the 
glory of the Qing. In Maogong, there had been such an initiative among some Han residents 
(including then-officials of the Qing, local militiamen, and immigrants). For instance, in 1912, 
132 local Hui Muslim civilians were murdered by Han royalists as revenge against the several 
Hui elites who participated in the large-scale anti-Qing Railway Protection Movement. The 
movement, which began in Sichuan in June 1911, facilitated the downfall of the Qing (see, for 
instance, Rankin 2002 and Zheng 2010).8 Many of the same Han royalists joined Zöpa’s uprising 
army to avenge the new Beiyang regime (1912–1927) and its supporters. 
 However, for Zöpa and most local Gyalrongwa, the attitude toward restoring the Qing 
was ambiguous and complex. In local accounts, Zöpa was little more than a naïve puppet who 
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had been tricked into the Han royalists’ scheme. This view probably simplifies the role of Zöpa 
in the revolt, but this kind of account does show that the position of Zöpa and local Gyalrongwa 
toward the Qing was frequently at odds with that of their Han associates and supporters. I will 
elaborate on this point later. 
 Zöpa was a monk in Bajiao Monastery, the largest monastery in Maogong and also one of 
the largest monasteries of the Gelugpa School in Gyalrong. The Bajiao Monastery housed five 
hundred monks at the height of its existence toward the end of the Qing reign. By the time the 
rebellion broke out in 1917, it sheltered a little over three hundred monks. The Bajiao region was 
a traditional territory ruled by the hereditary magistrate (shoubei), a Qing-appointed Gyalrong 
native commander in charge of local affairs. According to local accounts, Zöpa did not seem to 
have any particular talent for learning scripture and was even regarded as dull-witted by other 
monks. His daily routine consisted of fetching water and cleaning the monastery. However, Zöpa 
was known for his magical power and martial arts skills. It was said that, by invoking a 
protective deity, he was able to stab himself without injury.  
 According to the Zhongxian Gazette of the Republican Era (Zhongxian Gazette Office 
[1945] 2008), a Han from Luzhou known as Liu Xiaolian (xiaolian is a degree in the Qing’s 
imperial examination system) passed through Bajiao in 1916 and was amazed by Zöpa’s 
extraordinary skills. As a royalist who dreamed of restoring the Qing, Liu tried to persuade Zöpa 
to lead an uprising to restore the Qing. Zöpa refused at first, with the excuse that he was not 
capable of such an endeavor, but was eventually persuaded to consider it. At the time, two Han 
migrant workers heard about this plan and started to prepare the ground for Zöpa. These two 
individuals, a carpenter named Fu Nanshan (hereafter Fu) and a plasterer named Feng Ziqing 
(hereafter Feng), were former subordinates of Zhao Erfeng. All the local informants I spoke with 
said that they had not learned about Liu, but had heard much about Fu and Feng. Nonetheless, 
the details of my informants’ accounts, and of all the official, archival documents noted earlier, 
differ regarding how the two Han proceeded with their scheme to ennoble and sanctify Zöpa. 
 The general story line, however, is consistent. Fu and Feng were hired by a local noble, 
Jin Zhangpeng (hereafter Jin), to work on his new house. They hid a sword and a seal bearing the 
inscription “Universal Rule of the Great Qing” (daqing tongzhi) in the forest near Jin’s house. 
When Zöpa went out walking at night, they swung a flashlight behind him. Few monks or locals 
had ever seen a flashlight, so they were astonished to discover that Zöpa radiated light. Delighted 
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by the fact that their trick had worked perfectly, Fu and Feng claimed that it was an auspicious 
sign heralding the emergence of an emperor. Having urged Jin and the villagers to look out for 
other propitious signs, the two migrants guided them to the forest, where they found the hidden 
sword and seal. Jin and many other nobles, as well as most locals, were convinced from that 
point on that Zöpa was actually born to lead them as emperor. 
 As news of Zöpa’s miracles and his predestined role as the new ruler spread like wildfire, 
his two Han associates and close adherents set about preparing his enthronement. A Chinese-
language tutor in Bajiao, Wang Dunmin, was appointed as his secretary or counselor to produce 
“imperial edicts” on his behalf. It was not long before Zöpa and his supporters found a perfect 
moment for his enthronement. 
 The head (zhishi) of Fubian Magistrature,9 Zhang Xiaodong, was hunting birds in Bajiao 
when he accidentally fired his gun at the top of Bajiao Monastery, enraging the monks and the 
public. Seeing tensions rise, Zhang quickly left for the county seat. The monastery sent out an 
envoy of about ten monks to confront the county mayor, Yang Zhenyu, about this incident. The 
mayor succeeded in reassuring them by promising to look into the event right away and have the 
malefactor punished. Instead, he sent orders to Okzhi chieftain (tusi, a native chieftain formally 
recognized by the Qing) Yang Quanzhong and Bajiao magistrate Mu Jiguang to arrest the 
principal “rioters” in Bajiao Monastery. When Zöpa and his followers heard about this, they 
immediately held the enthronement ceremony for Zöpa on lunar March 8, 1917. The ceremony 
was attended by a large crowd of nobles and commoners from Bajiao and neighboring regions. 
Zöpa declared that year the “First Year of the Universal Rule of the Great Qing” (daqing tongzhi 
yuannian) and appointed four major army commanders: General Amu Lama, General Jin, left-
wing Minister-Marshal Fu, and right-wing Minister-Marshal Feng. 
 Zöpa’s newly founded empire’s mission is provided in a Chinese couplet10 that was 
posted in his monastery “palace.” It says, 
 
Either greater or lesser kings [warlords] in the eighteen provinces were no more 
than fiends in human shape. Without tearing apart the country, how could they 
stop? Among kings and rulers in the five continents, only I am qualified as a 
destined sovereign of the masses. I will thus become the First Emperor and 
rebuild the foundations from scratch. 
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He also issued an official statement in Chinese further explaining his motives and agenda: 
China has suffered for decades. I lament the fact that warlords seek excuses to 
stare at each other like hawks and tigers, but heaven is not yet fed up with the 
Qing. Declaring themselves rulers, the warlords are engaged in warfare with each 
other for the cession of the [national] territory. Dismayed to discover that the 
surviving impoverished subjects [of the Qing] are so starved and freezing that 
they savor their suffering in catching lice, I defer to the will of the heaven by 
rescuing the public from their never-ending pain. As a result, people will be able 
to own land, to feed themselves, to have clothes, to share equally, and to have 
money at their disposal, so that various fortunes come at once and every corner of 
the country lives in harmony like a family. I will crush evil and retain goodness to 
relieve misery, hold heaven and earth in my hands to exterminate the malicious, 
receive three blessings from heaven to restore our national territory, establish our 
country by combating our rivals, make other countries succumb to our authority, 
empower the public as the foundation of our territory, and enable them to enjoy 
peace without mutual intrusions. If anyone dares to stand in the way, the vanguard 
of my army will take you down in no time. 
 
 This edict basically served to justify an uprising during a turbulent era in which people 
were suffering from endless warfare. Zöpa announced that he was chosen by the heavens to 
rescue those in need and in pain, and to restore peace and order. This statement was, however, 
overshadowed by a simplified and much better publicized slogan, “Crush the Great Han, Rebuild 
the Great Qing” (mie da Han, li da Qing). In addressing local grievances and currying favor with 
a wider Gyalrong community, Zöpa and his native associates asserted, “We Gyalrongwa have 
been bullied too long. Now we have our own emperor. It is the right time to restore our freedom 
and take revenge for what the Qing has done to us since the Jinchuan campaigns.”11 Zöpa 
dispatched his army to destroy the imperial tablet at the county seat of Maogong. This tablet was 
inscribed with the text about the Qing’s achievement of quelling riots in the self-congratulatory 
tone of the great conqueror Emperor Qianlong. As this tablet forever reminded locals of their 
subjugation and humiliation, its destruction therefore symbolized their emancipation. What is 
more, a special slogan was created to target the foreign (French) missionary, “Exterminate the 
‘Gourd-head’” (shaguang hulu).12 
Zöpa first extradited Bajiao magistrate Mu Jiguang, who fled and sought refuge with the 
Okzhi chieftain (who had become his ally through marital exchanges). Zöpa also sent his 
emissaries to neighboring chieftains, nobles, and monasteries, ordering them to follow his lead 
and threatening to send his army to crush the disobedient. The Biesiman Magistrature, located 
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next to Bajiao, was one of the first to join his ranks after its magistrate had fled. The magistrates 
and/or nobles of Hanniu, Zailong, Hedong, and Hexi (in Maogong, Suijing, Chonghua, and 
Danba Counties) also joined Zöpa on his expedition. Moreover, one source says that chieftains 
including Tenpa, Choktsé, Somang, and Trokyap sent letters to Zöpa, endorsing his 
enthronement and referring to him as “our emperor” (Zhang Xiaozhong 2004). Altogether, these 
magistrates, nobles, and chieftains governed the majority of the Gyalrong region. In addition to 
Bajiao Monastery, another main monastery in Maogong County, Mupo Monastery, also 
dispatched a hundred monks, about half of its total population, to join Zöpa’s expedition. 
 Apart from his key Han associates, Fu and Feng, Zöpa’s expedition army was made up of 
other Han who saw an advantage to becoming his ally and supporting his uprising. As mentioned, 
many Han royalists, who were either staff from the previous county government of the Qing or 
local self-defense militia, joined Zöpa’s ranks. Moreover, while Fu and Feng made their way to 
Danba with their army, they were able to recruit about one thousand gold mine workers. In all, 
Zöpa mobilized nearly four thousand fighters, but his most trusted ones were those from Bajiao 
and Mupo Monasteries. Considering the fact that the overall population in Bajiao was likely 
about three thousand at that time,13 the four-thousand-man army was regarded as enormous. 
 Zöpa sent out four expedition squads to conquer neighboring regions: Okzhi; Danba and 
then Muping (in today’s Baoxin County); Suijin (in today’s Jinchuan County); and Chonghua (in 
today’s Jinchuan County). At first, the expedition armies succeeded in easily crushing the 
Republican army and local chieftains. They plundered vanquished places and killed those who 
resisted or refused to yield. The army that had been dispatched to Danba burned down a French 
Catholic church there because of the notorious reputation of foreigners and their “evil” religion, 
which I will discuss below. 
 Zöpa’s expeditions were initially successful for two main reasons. First, his slogan and 
agenda drew in the public, both Gyalrong locals and the Han. Second, as noted, at that time 
warlords in Sichuan were busy fighting against invading Yunnan and Guizhou troops, and the 
Sichuan provincial government became so mired that it was unable to respond effectively. 
However, the Sichuan government gathered together an increasing number of soldiers, and more 
soldiers were sent by both nobles and commoners from conquered regions. Zöpa’s expeditions 
then started to lose ground on each front. His troops consequently had to retreat to the Bajiao 
Monastery, which was soon surrounded by the Republican army sent by the provincial 
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government as well as soldiers dispatched by Gyalrong chieftains and nobles. Constructed out of 
heavy rocks, and having several huge, solid gates, the monastery was transformed into a nearly 
impenetrable garrison. Zöpa and his besieged soldiers were thus able to defend themselves 
against the invading army for about three months. 
 Eventually, in the lunar month of July, Zöpa and his major associate, Fu, were captured 
and taken to Chengdu, where they were executed. Zöpa’s head was taken back to his monastery, 
where it was put on public display as a warning to locals in Bajiao and Maogong. The monastery 
was burned to the ground. Nearly a thousand imprisoned soldiers and close adherents of Zöpa 
were killed on the spot. Their bodies were disposed of and buried at a place below the monastery, 
which has since been known as the “Ten-Thousand Pit” (wanren keng) to emphasize that a great 
number of people were killed. The revolt, which lasted only about four months, was thus 
completely quashed. 
 
Memory as a Rallying Cry 
 At the time of the revolt, except for some nobles and learned lamas who had some 
knowledge of political changes in China, the majority of locals believed that they were still ruled 
by the “Chinese emperor.” Many could not even distinguish the Manchu from the Han. They 
continued to be ruled directly by their chieftains or magistrates, as in former times. Thus, for 
most of them, things did not seem to have changed much. Therefore, their support for Zöpa’s 
uprising was related not so much to their embracing the Qing or imperial system, but more to the 
legacy of the two Jinchuan campaigns. The legends and folk songs about the cruelty of the Qing 
court in the campaigns, as well as the heroism of local warriors, remained part of the locals’ 
“lived experiences.”14 
 As far as the locals were concerned, the most devastating consequence of their defeat, 
and of subsequent reforms, was the curtailment of their autonomy, which rendered them 
subservient. This was seen by locals as incapacitating their own abilities to forestall the invasion 
and coercion of both the Han and foreign missionaries. Moreover, local societies in Maogong 
were highly divided. Their group allegiance was normally built on a common administrative 
affiliation under the jurisdiction of the same chieftain or magistrature. Therefore, Zöpa surely 
saw the advantage of using shared memories of the Jinchuan campaigns, and subsequent agonies, 
as a rallying cry to transcend such differences. 
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Memory of the Jinchuan Campaigns 
 The Jinchuan campaigns started in a climate of internal warfare among the chieftains of 
Da Jinchuan, Xiao Jinchuan, Mingzheng, Geshiza, Okzhi, and other Gyalrong chieftains.15 The 
Qing court took into account Gyalrong’s strategically important location in connecting Kham, 
Amdo, Central Tibet, and the Han interiors. The court was also concerned about the negative 
implications of opposition from other unruly chieftains. Consequently, it intervened by sending a 
large army to quell the unrest. Yet it received unexpectedly strong resistance from the Da 
Jinchuan chieftain. 
 The first Jinchuan campaign (1747–1749) ended with the Da Jinchuan chieftain’s 
surrender. His successors, though, continued the drive toward expansion and growth and also 
prepared for the court’s likely revenge. Subsequent Da Jinchuan chieftains allied themselves 
with two of the most powerful Gyalrong chieftains, Trokyap and Xiao Jinchuan, in order to 
achieve their shared goal of self-preservation. According to local legends, the succeeding Da 
Jinchuan chieftains realized that the Qing court would not easily forgive Da Jinchuan’s defiance 
and would therefore take revenge by completely removing this obstacle from the Qing’s path to 
expansion. This unofficial account was credible considering the fact that the Qing saw the 
potential threat from hundreds of greater and lesser chieftains that it had officially recognized. 
The Jinchuan incidents heightened the court’s anxiety over its territorial stability and effective 
control over border regions. 
 The rise in the number of invasions of other chieftains’ territories by Da Jinchuan and its 
ally, Xiao Jinchuan, led the Qing court to launch another round of large-scale military 
interventions known as the second Jinchuan campaign (1771–1776). It was even more difficult 
for the Qing to gain the upper hand during this campaign. Although these two chieftains were 
eventually defeated, the court was not prepared to pay such a huge price in manpower, casualties, 
and financial expenses. As a consequence, Emperor Qianlong became so choleric that he ordered 
the extermination of the local populations. Only a small number of locals survived, by hiding or 
escaping. Today there are many stories about the Qing army’s vengeful massacre. According to 
one version I gathered in the field, 
 
Qing soldiers would ask each captured local the same question: “Will you choose 
the emperor [Qianlong] or your chieftain as your master?” Those who selected the 
emperor received the promise that their lives were to be spared. However, every 
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single captive answered, “I want our chieftain.” They would then be decapitated 
on the spot with a sword. As a result, the sword became too blunt to be used and 
the whole river [Da Jinchuan River in Jinchuan County, and Xiao Jinchuan River 
in Xiaojin County], filled with dead bodies, turned a crimson color. However, the 
days went by and still no one capitulated. Consequently, the executioners could 
no longer bear this and petitioned the court to grant mercy by arguing that the 
locals were so courageous and daring that they would, in the long term, serve the 
empire. Thus, some elderly people, women, and children survived.16 
 
The important underlying message is that the merciless emperor had to back down because of the 
locals’ courage and unconditional loyalty to their chieftains. Returning to the Bajiao uprising, we 
can now see how Zöpa took advantage of such sentiments in two complementary ways. First, the 
Qing nearly wiped out the locals during the Jinchuan campaigns. To the Bajiao people, such a 
cruel act should not be forgotten or forgiven. Second, the locals’ fearlessness ultimately pushed 
the ruthless emperor to grant mercy, as he was convinced that their spirit could not be crushed. 
 Therefore, the strategy of using the Jinchuan campaigns as a rallying cry for the revolt 
seemed ideal. At the same time, Gyalrong natives believed (and still do today) that subsequent 
reforms after the campaigns compromised the possibility of breathing new life into Da Jinchuan 
and Xiao Jinchuan, and Gyalrong as a whole. Therefore, nostalgia for the “glorious” past would 
easily motivate the locals to embrace the ideal of restoring “our own chieftain” and the 
subsequent grandeur of Gyalrong. 
 After the campaigns, the Qing court directly administered the two Jinchuans by 
dispatching appointed officials and designating local representatives, a strategy known as 
“substituting chieftains with state-appointed civilian officials.” In these two places, only the 
Okzhi chieftain retained his position. He was the one who had been bullied by the two Jinchuan 
chieftains and thus assisted the Qing in getting the better of them. The court also established 
seven Han magistratures (Hantun) and six native magistratures (tutun), including Bajiao.17 The 
Han magistratures were usually headed by Han officials dispatched by the court, while native 
magistratures were in charge of the court-designated local nobles. The native leaders also had 
authority over those from other Gyalrong regions who were rewarded for assisting the Qing’s 
conquering of Da Jinchuan and Xiao Jinchuan. 
As the Okzhi chieftain was able to retain his traditional power, he and his successors had 
absolute power over his subjects. They drafted the militia, levied taxes, assigned various duties, 
punished (and even executed) perpetrators, and so on. Native Gyalrongwa who lived in places 
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that had suffered from the unrest, as well as “soldiers of the magistrature (tunbing),” were 
governed by magistrates. Magistrates were court-appointed officers by title, so they were 
formally integrated into the Qing’s administrative system. Their status, though, still resembled 
that of chieftains. In exchange for the loyalty of these local elites, the Qing decided that the 
official title of magistrate would be hereditary. Although they wielded just as much power as 
chieftains in their own magistratures, one distinctive difference was that magistrates were 
supposed to fulfill more court-appointed military and non-military administrative duties than 
chieftains. For instance, these magistrates were ordered by the court to send a number of local 
men to join the Qing. These conscripts fought the invasion of the Gurkhas from Nepal toward the 
end of the eighteenth century and fought against the British during the Opium Wars in the 
nineteenth century. Additionally, the locals ruled by magistrates were to pay taxes and fulfill 
duties such as farming and other kinds of labor, including corvée, for both magistrates and the 
county-level Qing administration. As a consequence, subjects of magistrates were usually more 
exploited owing to the fact that they had two masters. Many in Bajiao would contrast their own 
state of existence to that of the Okzhi people, whom they believed to be better off economically 
and in all other respects because they had a more powerful protector in their chieftain. Therefore, 
as mentioned earlier, for the majority of locals, the Bajiao uprising sought to restore the 
abolished chieftain system. 
 This wish was also a repercussion of late Qing and Republican policies regarding the 
Tibetan borderlands. Toward the end of the Qing rule, the administrative practice of “substituting 
chieftains with state-appointed civilian officials” became an even more popular agenda in 
Sichuan’s Sino-Tibetan borderlands, as evidenced by Zhao Erfeng’s series of ambitious reforms 
and new policies to secure this border region within China’s sovereignty. Therefore, even 
hereditary magistrates might be replaced by officials not from within, but from outside—not to 
mention the quasi-self-governing chieftain system. Given the circumstances, the nobles and most 
locals were more and more desperate to hold on to a more desirable political system in which 
they and their chieftains had greater control over their own internal affairs. 
 
 
 
Ethnic Tensions and Beyond 
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 The proclaimed anti-Qing agenda simultaneously reflected the conflicting attitudes of 
Zöpa and Bajiao locals toward the Qing. If the Qing were the enemy, why would they claim to 
restore the Qing? A plausible answer is that they had different agendas vis-à-vis Zöpa’s Han 
associates. Most locals wished to restore the relinquished chieftain system. Thus, in the eyes of 
the locals, the Qing referred to an external dominant force that had vanquished them. This 
abstract entity was represented by the Han and their administrations. In a way, restoring the Qing 
was necessary to regain what had been taken away by this powerful Han-dominated entity. To 
achieve this goal, it was of crucial importance to wage a battle against the present Han regime 
and its representatives, including the local chieftains, magistrates, and nobles, as well as 
commoners who backed the Han regime. 
 Although this might explain why the locals’ anti-Qing campaign was just as much an 
anti-Han one, how are we to make sense of the fact that Zöpa’s key associates or advisors were 
actually Han themselves? First of all, we need to differentiate between, on the one hand, the 
Great Han (da Han)—as in the slogan mie da Han, or “Crush the Great Han”—and, on the other 
hand, the Han general public. “Great Han” implied the military and executive authorities at the 
time (Zhang Xiaozhong 2004), so the slogan referred to the agenda of overthrowing the Republic. 
Using the ethnic-sounding label to enlist support from Bajiao and Gyalrong natives might have 
been a strategy of Feng and Fu. However, it soon turned into a Han cleansing (xi Han) campaign 
targeting the Han public. This shift was inseparable from the legacy of the Jinchuan campaigns 
and ethnic tensions in this region. 
 As most locals were killed during and after the battles, the Qing encouraged the Han to 
immigrate to the two Jinchuans by offering them land, cattle, farming tools, grain, and other 
subsidies. Soon after this policy was implemented in 1776, it attracted 1,186 households of Han 
immigrants. They were known as “magistrature civilians” (tunmin), and they were under direct 
jurisdiction of Han magistratures. The Qing recruited 2,596 “soldiers of magistrature” who 
served the role of overseeing the locals while also cultivating allocated land. The majority of 
them were Han, but there were also Gyalrongwa, as well as other indigenous populations (whose 
ethnicity is now defined as “Qiangzu”) from Zagu’nao, Baoxian, and Weizhou. These “soldiers 
of magistrature” were administered by native magistrates, and many of them were gradually 
integrated into the local Gyalrongwa population. There were also some Hui Muslims among the 
“soldiers of magistrature,” and they became the first Hui settlers in the two Jinchuans.18 
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Additionally, there were still 1,969 defeated local households that were subjected to the rules of 
the heads (magistrates) of native magistratures. 
 Local accounts claim that Han immigrant officers were granted fertile land in the valley, 
while Han commoners occupied land on the slopes higher up the mountains. The local 
Gyalrongwa were relocated from these places to the mountaintops. This is in keeping with 
historical facts (see, for instance, Peng 2007). Nevertheless, largely because the Han and 
Gyalrongwa had different masters or administrators and had dissimilar languages and customs 
(and hence did not share much sociopolitical space in their daily lives), the two parties did not 
experience serious confrontations. That said, the local Gyalrongwa bore a grudge against the Han 
because their fertile land had been “stolen” by Han immigrants, and because the latter were also 
considered sly, dishonest, and therefore untrustworthy.19 According to local accounts, unless 
absolutely necessary, Han residents, including gangs, would not normally take the initiative to 
start a fight with local Gyalrongwa. If they did, a provocation often ended with the whole village, 
or other villages under the same magistrate or chieftain, taking collective revenge. 
 Native Gyalrong villagers took pride in this accord. They shared the conviction that they 
had a common magistrate or chieftain who would protect them against intruders. Thus, 
magistrates or chieftains had to prove that they were capable of defending the common interests 
of their subjects; otherwise, their status might be challenged by the subjects. As stated above, as 
far as people in Bajiao were concerned, Okzhi people were more daring and united simply 
because their chieftain had more authority and power and could therefore do more to safeguard 
local interests. 
 Soon after the start of the Bajiao uprising, many people from Gyalrong called for a Han-
cleansing agenda through reignited memories of a “pure” Gyalrongwa state in the pre–Jinchuan 
campaigns period. They would randomly shoot at the Han, even their neighbors, on sight. Based 
on oral accounts, even Fu and Feng felt their own lives threatened by this escalating tension. 
Zöpa tried to act as mediator, but the situation was getting out of control. When the Han rallied 
together in retaliation as the Republican soldiers started to gain the upper hand and round up the 
rebels, the Han began to do exactly the same to the local Gyalrongwa. 
 If we were to regard this uprising exclusively as ethnically defined or divided, we would 
lose sight of a more intricate picture. A strong message was indeed conveyed through the slogans 
and publicized agendas calling for the Gyalrongwa to unite. However, the army of insurgents 
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treated all subversives and opponents as enemies to be eradicated regardless of their ethnicity. 
One source says that the expedition army killed over seventy Han and Gyalrongwa households in 
the Hedong Magistrature, Suijing. Over a thousand villagers had fled, only to find when they 
returned home after the rioters had left that most of their belongings had been looted (Zhang 
Xiaozhong 1993). However, it is undeniable that ethnic boundaries were still salient and clear-
cut, which partly explains why the uprising ended so rapidly. The Han-cleansing slogan shows 
that many Gyalrongwa felt strong animosity toward the Han, a fact that obviously undermined 
the very foundations of the uprising started by Zöpa and his Han allies. 
 
An Anti-Missionary Agenda 
 By 1917, Bajiao and Maogong Counties harbored a strong anti-missionary sentiment. 
Before the uprising, there had been no systematic missionary activities in Maogong, but the 
locals had heard exaggerated accounts of misdeeds by foreign explorers and/or missionaries. For 
example, it was widely believed among locals that foreigners came there to steal gold or treasure. 
As this treasure was usually “hidden” in a sacred mountain, foreign explorers would deprive the 
locals of their rare gemstones and their “good luck and prosperity,” such as great harvests and 
their well-being.20 Such a message was often conveyed to the public through religious figures. A 
story I heard in Mupo recounted how a foreign passerby pretended to make friends with a 
distinguished geshe (a degree holder in the Gelugpa religious system) in order to solicit 
information regarding the treasure in the monastery and the region. This may not sound much 
different from the rumors or misgivings in Batang and elsewhere in Kham. There, anti-
missionary activities became a common scene (see Deng 2006; Wang Xiao 2013). Nevertheless, 
the Bajiao case was quite unique. Although anti-foreigner sentiment had long existed in this 
region, it was not at first associated with the repercussions of missionary activities. Rather, this 
sentiment derived from locals’ memories of “evil” foreigners. Many of these relevant accounts, 
however, were empirically unfounded or distorted. 
 According to Qing official records, such as the Veritable Records of the Great Qing in 
the Reign of Daoguang (Daqing xuanzong chenghuangdi daoguang shilu), Magistrate Ashen was 
ordered by the Qing, in 1841, to send his militiamen to join the campaign against the British 
invasion of Ningbo, Zhejiang Province. Magistrate Ashen and his soldiers all died in an ambush 
laid by the British army on March 10, 1842. Ashen had been dispatched simply to fulfill his 
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obligations as court-appointed magistrate. However, according to the legend in Bajiao, Ashen 
went into battle mainly to avenge the act of sorcery committed by foreigners (British) while 
burying his predecessor, Druktar. As the first Bajiao magistrate, Druktar had been sent by the 
Qing to defend Tibet against the invading Gurkhas army at the end of the nineteenth century. His 
heroic act and military talents were said to have intimidated the foreigners to the extent that they 
resorted to “black magic” to remove the threat once and for all. According to the story, 
 
Druktar died in Qinghai after the Tibet campaign. While his body was sent back 
to Bajiao, the foreigners forced the [Qing] officials to allow them to bury him 
without the locals’ interference. They chained his body to his tomb so that it hung 
in mid-air, touching neither the ground nor the ceiling, to prevent him [his body] 
from reaching either the earth or heaven. This course of action forestalled his 
resuscitation and the rise of his descendants to undermine their [foreigners’] 
“good cause” [invasions]. Even so, they were still worried about his possible 
resurrection, and so one night they came to empty the tomb and to remove the 
body without the locals’ knowledge. Later, Ashen was also killed by the British in 
battles in Ningbo. Since the [Bajiao] locals were outraged at the craftiness and 
cruelty of these foreigners, they would follow Zöpa’s call to oust the foreigners 
completely.… The revolt was doomed at the very outset because the foreigners’ 
behavior had transformed the flow of energy in Bajiao.21 
 
This account is full of historical errors and inaccuracies. For instance, Druktar did not die in 
Qinghai. Nor was there corroborating evidence of any British revenge. On the whole, Bajiao 
locals tend to confuse the names and deeds of Ashen with those of Druktar. My informants 
debated among themselves as to whether it was the tomb of Ashen or Druktar that was emptied 
by the British. However, this confusion does nothing to dilute the Bajiao rebels’ anti-foreigner 
sentiment. More specifically, the sorcery was said to have been practiced by priests or 
missionaries with mystical powers “just like our lamas.” The foreigners, though, represented evil 
forces that would induce bad luck or even disasters, in contrast to “our” well-disposed and 
altruistic lamas. 
 The anxiety over foreign sorcery derived from a backlash against the increasing 
infiltration of assumed heresy from overseas. There was also a backlash against the total failure 
of the Qing, and the subsequent Republic, to protect local monasteries and communities from 
such encroachment. Therefore, by appropriating locals’ sentimental memories and images of 
“evil” foreigners and missionaries, Zöpa’s expedition army justified its burning of a church in 
Danba. However, based on the logic of the abovementioned account, foreigners’ misdeeds not 
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only were the cause of the rebels’ attack but also served to bring down the uprising. For that 
reason, foreigners, especially missionaries, were considered inexcusable devils. Since Zöpa and 
his closest followers and allies were from Bajiao and Mupo Monasteries, this uprising was 
essentially religious. This means that a war against foreign cults was both sanctioned by local 
religious establishments and endorsed by most local populations. 
 
Conclusion 
 Despite the somewhat messianic role played by Zöpa, it may seem implausible that this 
low-ranking monk was able to lead a revolt, or that this uprising could break out in the first place. 
The archives and ethnographic data I gathered are inadequate to fully address these questions. 
Nor do they provide a more comprehensive picture of the sociopolitical contexts of the local 
society. For instance, accounts about the three Han behind Zöpa (Liu, Feng, and Fu) are always 
too sketchy. It is not quite clear who they really were, why they went to Bajiao, how they 
convinced Zöpa to lead, and so on. There are even fewer records or anecdotes about Han 
participants in Zöpa’s uprising, or about the role and deeds of local Han royalists. 
 Moreover, to some extent informed by Marxist-scientific notions, the locals I interviewed 
liked to say that the elder generations were so “dumb,” “backward,” and “superstitious” that even 
a flashlight would fool and convince them that Zöpa was the heaven-sent emperor. At the same 
time, many locals interpreted the defeat of the uprising as the result of the calculating Han’s dirty 
tricks, which had duped Zöpa into the revolt in the beginning. Above all, Zöpa is remembered as 
no more than a figurehead. His personal experiences, as well as his concerns and interests, 
occupy little place in local accounts. Consequently, Zöpa is still an ambiguous, or nearly 
mysterious, figure in locals’ oral accounts of the revolt. At the same time, both archival and 
ethnographic data provide only fragmentary or unverifiable data regarding how historical 
connections between Lhasa and local religious establishments played out in the revolt. Nor do 
the data indicate how other monasteries, chieftains, and the general Gyalrongwa actually 
responded to the revolt. 
 Such flaws in available data obscure the nature, purpose, agendas, tactics, internal politics, 
external forces, and broader implications of the revolt. Therefore, with only the available data to 
build on, this article is limited to contextualizing this uprising only in an inconclusive, and not 
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fully satisfactory, way. I argue, though, that these data do offer some promising clues for more 
substantial interpretations in the future. 
 The uprising was both local and extra-local. When considered from a broad perspective, 
it was deeply implicated in the repercussions of and backlashes against the Qing’s downfall and 
the new Republican state’s rise. To be specific, it was caught in the maelstrom of conflicts 
between revolutionaries and conservatives (including royalists). Simultaneously, the uprising 
was entangled not only in rivalries between central and local states and the “dog fights” between 
greater and lesser warlords, but also in the dynamic relations between heightened Chinese 
nationalism and aggravated foreign encroachment. Hence, the revolt was a localized 
exemplification of the macroscopic social landscape of China in its transition from the feudal 
Qing era to the Republic. More precisely, embedded in memories of the Jinchuan campaigns, as 
well as in the status quo of early twentieth-century Bajiao and Maogong, the Bajiao uprising was 
an incentive for its Gyalrong followers to pursue and advance ethnic and religious agendas to 
negotiate both micro- and macropolitics in which they were deeply entangled. 
 The locals at the time believed that, during the “golden age,” “our chieftains” were able 
to keep the Qing at arm’s length by paying ritualistic tribute to the court while maintaining their 
de facto sovereignty. Such yearning for, and memory of, the idealized past was so strong that 
Zöpa was able to use this situation to his own advantage. While amplifying the locals’ sense of 
the humiliation and injustice inflicted on them by the Qing, Zöpa managed to promise hope that 
such suffering could end. Therefore, most local adherents were not really interested in restoring 
the Qing. Instead, they longed for the return of the “glorious past.” For this endeavor, locals were 
convinced that Han immigrants and vicious foreigners, both of whom precipitated memories of 
locals’ agony and mortification, should be removed from local political and social realms once 
and for all. In a word, locals’ memories of the Jinchuan campaigns and subsequent pains and 
shames were instrumental in their support of the revolt. However, this may still be insufficient in 
explaining why the revolt was endorsed by the majority of the local Bajiao population. 
 The oral anecdotes and accounts I collected suggest that tensions between the (Bajiao) 
monastery and local ruler (magistrate) may have contributed to Zöpa’s initial commitment to the 
revolt and to the locals’ backing. According to my informants, especially Tsanlha Ngawang, the 
present reincarnate lama of Bajiao Monastery, the magistrates of different times endeavored to 
contain the impact and growth of the monastery. As a result, the monastery had a grudge against 
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the interference of the Bajiao magistrate in its affairs. Therefore, to some extent, this revolt was 
the revenge of Zöpa and the monastery against the magistrate. Since locals would easily follow a 
call in the name of defending their religion, they helped Zöpa extradite Magistrate Mu Jiguang at 
the start of the revolt. 
 It is true that the field accounts I collected were quite confusing and even spurious, due in 
large part to forgotten or blurred details. After all, the revolt happened almost one hundred years 
ago. The inaccuracies are also inseparable from ideologically charged inculcations. For instance, 
my informants called the Kuomintang “the reactionary,” foreigners “foreign ghosts,” and the 
people’s worship of Zöpa “feudal beliefs.” Moreover, I realize that it was sometimes quite 
difficult, if not impossible, to discern informants’ own agendas in these accounts and to 
determine their actual sources. For instance, I sensed that a few informants’ accounts might have 
derived from some of the archived accounts of the revolt they had read or heard about. 
 Despite these problems, these oral narratives are valuable in offering new insights into 
the multifarious sides and layers of the revolt, including sources of ethnic tensions and anti-
foreigner sentiment, that had been ignored in archives. The question then is: why were these 
aspects ignored in the archived accounts in the first place? The burning of the church by rebels is 
portrayed in official documents as a consequence of the missionaries’ avarice and extortions and, 
above all, a consequence of Western colonization. This standard official statement, which is to 
be found in almost all accounts of anti-missionary activities throughout the country, obscures or 
conceals the particularity of this uprising regarding the roots of locals’ anti-missionary 
sentiments. More noteworthy, ethnic conflicts before 1949 are largely defined by the party-state 
as a deliberate action of the “reactionary” Kuomintang and feudal lords in juxtaposition with the 
present so-called harmonious ethnic relations in China. Therefore, the locals’ accounts of the 
tensions between the Han and themselves would have been deliberately omitted by state-sent 
investigators. 
 I do not, though, intend to assert that all ignored aspects of the revolt were the result of 
political manipulation. As a matter of fact, such exclusions have much to do with the different 
perspectives and agendas of researchers. As a present-day anthropologist, I have cultivated more 
or less “standard” (many-sided and actor-oriented) perspectives on the research subject and on 
people’s concerns and interests. Therefore, while previous investigators and researchers were 
accustomed to a grand narrative approach, I attach much more importance to the divergent forces 
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and heterogeneous interests involved in the revolt. In so doing, I have been able to retrieve some 
of the accounts to which other researchers may not have attended. 
 In a nutshell, I argue that my ethnographic research, and the recounted local memories I 
collected, make up for some of the deficiencies of previous archival research. In so doing, this 
work offers an inquiry into the locals’ own concerns and interests. It also investigates intricate 
and multifaceted particulars of the 1917 Bajiao revolt, including heterogeneity and divisions 
within Gyalrong, ethnic conflicts, and representations of foreigners and missionaries. By 
showing how written documents and oral histories constitute contending, but complementary, 
narratives about social transformations, this article demonstrates how archival research and 
ethnographic work can be integrated for a more nuanced and multidimensional understanding of 
a recent historical event. 
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Glossary  
In-Text Vocabulary Chinese Characters Tibetan Transliteration 
Amu 阿穆 a dmu 
Ashen 阿木镶 a gshen 
Bajiao 八角 bsod nams yag 
Bajiao Monastery 八角喇嘛寺 seng ge bkra shis chos gling 
Baoxian 
Baoxing 
保县 
宝兴 
 
Biesiman  别斯满 byes smad 
Chinese Emperor  rgya nag gong ma 
Choktsé 卓克基 cog tse 
Chonghua 崇化  
Da Han  大汉  
Da Jinchuan 大金川 chu chen 
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Danba 
Dang’an 
Daqing xuanzong chenghuangdi 
Daoguang shilu 
 
Daqing tongzhi 
Daqing tongzhi yuannian 
 
丹巴 
档案 
大清宣宗成皇帝（道
光）实录 
大清通治 
大清通治元年 
rong brag 
Druktar 穆塔尔 ‘brug thar 
Eighteen kingdoms of Gyalrong  rgyal rong rgyal khab bco 
brgyad 
Shaguang hulu 杀光葫芦  
Feng Ziqing 冯子卿  
Fubian 
Fu Nanshan 
Gaitu guiliu  
抚边 
傅南山 
改土归流 
 
Geshiza 革什杂 dge shis tsa 
Pao ge 袍哥  
Hanniu 
Hantun  
汗牛 
汉屯 
hwa nyong  
Hedong 河东 li wer 
Hexi 河西 spo gdong 
Jin Zhangpeng 金张鹏  
Lixian 理县 rgyal kha 
Luzhou 
Lü Guang 
泸州 
吕光 
 
Maogong 懋功 tsan lha 
Miedahan, lidaqing 灭大汉，立大清  
Mingzheng 明正 lcags la 
Mu Jiguang 
Mudo 
Muping 
Mupo 
穆济光 
墨尔多 
穆坪 
木坡 
 
dmu rdo 
mu phyi 
mi pham 
Mupo Monastery 木坡喇嘛寺 byes smad mi pham dgon 
Okzhi 沃日 ‘og gzhi 
Rilong 
Shiquan wugong 
日隆 
十全武功 
bzhi lung 
Shoubei 守备  
Somang 梭磨 so mang 
Suijing 绥靖  
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Tenpa 党坝 bstan pa 
Trokyap 绰斯甲 khro skyabs 
Tsatö Zöpa 察都·若巴 tsha stod bzod pa 
Tun 
Tunbing 
屯 
屯兵 
 
Tunmin 屯民  
Tusi 
Tutun 
土司 
土屯 
rgyal po 
Wang Dunmin 
Wanren keng 
王遁民 
万人坑 
 
Weizhou 维州 khri tshang 
Xianzhiban  县志办  
Xiaojin/Xiao Jinchuan 
Xiaojin xianwei ban’gongshi 
小金（川） 
小金县委办公室 
tsan lha 
Xiaolian 
Xi Han 
Xinan minzu xueyuan 
孝廉 
洗汉 
西南民族学院 
 
Yang Quanzhong 杨全忠  
Yang Zhenyu 
Yuan Shikai 
杨震宇 
袁世凯 
 
Zagu nao 杂谷脑 brag sgam nang 
Zailong 宅垄 gter mdal 
Zhang Xiaodong 张晓东  
Zhao Erfeng 
Zhengxie  
赵尔丰 
政协 
 
Zhishi 知事  
 
 
Notes 
 
1 In this article, the names of local places are usually spelled in Chinese (pinyin); their 
original Tibetan spellings can be found in the glossary. The reason for this is that Chinese 
transliterations have become the official administrative names of these places. They not 
only appear in Chinese-language archives and official documents, but are also currently 
used by the people of Gyalrong. As there are often multiple Chinese transliterations for a 
single Tibetan proper name, I chose the most common term as its “standard” spelling.  
2 Gyalrong is situated on the southeastern edge of the Tibetan Plateau. This region used to 
be ruled by eighteen local chieftains or kings and is therefore often referred to as the 
“eighteen kingdoms of Gyalrong.” The Gyalrong region is not only inhabited by the 
Gyalrongwa (people from Gyalrong), but also by Tibetans from two other subgroups: 
Amdo and Khampa Tibetans. There are also populations of Qiangzu, Han, Hui, and 
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others. The overall population of Gyalrongwa is about 300,000. A comprehensive study 
of Gyalrong history and culture can be found in works by Tsanlha Ngawang and his 
collaborators (Btsan lha, rDorje, and Hongyin 2003; Zanla and Xiawa 2009), as well as 
by others (Quedan 1990; Li and Li 1995; Baiwan 2009).  
3 Memory has been an increasingly popular topic in history, anthropology, and other 
disciplines since the 1980s, but especially in the last decade. One of the fundamental lines 
of inquiry focuses on the politics of memory, which involve dynamic interactions 
between memory and history, and between the present and the past. More specifically, 
this kind of inquiry addresses the use of memory and history for ideological and political 
agendas, and for identity reconstruction (see, for instance, Halbwachs 1980; Roth 1995; 
Fabian 1996; Nora and Kritzman 1996; Samuel 2012). In the fields of Chinese and 
Tibetan studies, an extensive scholarship contributes to the study of memories of 
revolutions and trauma since the late Qing period. Much of this research focuses on 
political turmoil during the socialist era and post–Mao period nostalgia for a great and 
“uncontaminated” (by modernity) past (e.g., Jing 1996; Litzinger 1998; Mueggler 2001; 
McGranahan 2010; and Hershatter 2011, among others).  
4 Zhao Erfeng’s reform, as part of the late Qing policy regarding the Tibetan borderlands, 
is thoroughly discussed by Wang Xiuyu (2011), among others.  
5 The political role of Yuan Shikai in late imperial China and during the early Republican 
era has been discussed thoroughly in academia, including by Stephen R. MacKinnon 
(1980), John K. Fairbank (1980, 1983), and Zhang Xianwen (2005).  
6 For instance, the restoration activities (1915–1917) by Lü Guang, a self-proclaimed 
prince of the Qing, were ratified or sponsored by many nobles and monks of Mongolian, 
Tibetan, and other ethnicities in Qinghai and Gansu (Zhou 1993). 
7 Zhang’s royalist army was soon defeated by Republican troops. This farce only lasted 
about ten days, after which Zhang had to take refuge at the Dutch legation. Xu Zhiyan 
(2007) and Zhang Ming (2014), among others, have studied this incident.  
8 By opposing the Qing’s agenda to nationalize local railway projects and transfer 
construction rights to foreign banks, this movement appealed to a large number of 
participants from all walks of life in Sichuan and other provinces. It further undermined 
the already shaky foundation of the Qing. However, I would like to point out that the 
massacre of the Hui civilians should be understood within a more complex and broader 
sociopolitical and ethnic context. As David G. Atwill (2005) points out, often with the 
Qing court and local officials’ collusion and tolerance, violence against the Hui, 
including massacre predominantly by Han perpetrators, has not been unusual in 
southwest China since the late Qing period. Such violence normally arose with the influx 
of Han settlers in these border regions, where the Hui dominated the same occupations 
(trade, agriculture, and mining) that the Han sought (Atwill 2005, 6).   
9 Zhishi is the official title for the head of the Han magistrature, and hence it essentially 
means “magistrate.” However, to avoid confusion, the term “magistrate” is reserved 
specifically for shoubei, the native (Gyalrong) head of the magistrature.   
10 This couplet, as well as the edict below it, is seen in Zhang Liming (1988).  
11 Based on an interview with Tsanlha Ngawang, aged eighty-five, in Maerkang on 
February 28, 2015. A similar account is found in Jiamuyang (2009, 386). 
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12 “Gourd-head” refers to Catholic converts, as their heads were said (mostly imagined) to 
have been shaved to resemble a gourd.  
13 This estimation is based on historical accounts and various interviews.  
14 The ferocity of these battles can be verified by taking a look at the Qing’s colossal 
expenses. The two campaigns cost the Qing about 100 million taels of silver, which 
constituted two-thirds of the overall expenditure on the so-called “Ten Great Campaigns” 
(shiquan wugong) by Qianlong (Peng 2004). They probably became the most expensive 
wars that took place on imperial territory in Qing history. 
15 The extensive research that has been carried out on the two campaigns usually focuses on 
the reason why they occurred, their repercussions in the form of local political and social 
change, and the Qing’s policy adjustments toward its borderlands and chieftains (see, for 
instance, Martin 1990; Greatrex 1994; Peng 2004, 2007; Karmay 2005; Qi and Wang 
2008; Xu Fayan 2011, 2012; Ryosuke 2014). Some works have focused on more specific 
aspects of these campaigns, e.g., military labor (Dai Yingcong 2001), underlying cultural 
politics (Waley-Cohen 2006), and logistics and finances (Theobald 2013).  
16 This was based on an interview with Yang Zonggui, aged seventy-five, in Mupo on 
February 7, 2015. I have personally heard a similar story several times in Dao Jinchuan 
and Xiao Jinchuan.  
17 Bajiao’s first magistrate, Druktar, a Gyalrong noble from today’s Lixian, was relocated 
by the Qing. 
18 It is said that there were a few Manchu and Mongol “soldiers of magistrature” as well, 
but I have not yet seen any direct sources confirming this claim. 
19 The local Hui residents (some two hundred households with a population of about one 
thousand by the first decade of the twentieth century) were generally believed to be 
cunning and even more unreliable compared to the Han, largely due to Gyalrong natives’ 
disapproval of Islamic practices. The Hui did not, however, become a direct target of the 
uprising, since they were not considered to have contributed significantly to Gyalrong 
locals’ suffering.   
20  It is a widespread belief in Gyalrong and other Tibetan cultural regions that a holy 
mountain is normally rich in various types of gemstones and (other) treasure as they are 
considered to embody and generate sacred power. Such treasures are “hidden” in the deep 
mountain in the sense that they are not easily accessible to people. If such treasures are 
stolen or taken away, this is believed to affect the well-being of the local society. For 
instance, in a religious text presumably written in the eighteenth century—Gyalrong’s 
Holy Land—Mt. Mudo (Tib. rgyal mo rong gi gnas chen dmu rdo) (Danba County 
Political Consultative Conference 1992)—we can see the direct connection between the 
sacredness of this most holy mountain in Gyalrong, or the power of its mountain deity, 
and the abundance of its rare treasure. 
21 Collected in Bajiao, Xiaojin on February 6, 2015, this story was collectively told by four 
xmajor informants: Yang Bokang, Zheng Yonghe, Zhong Yuquan, and Dong Kewu. In 
native beliefs, a person’s well-being is inseparable from their rlung, or “flow of energy.” 
If the regular flow of energy is interrupted through human intervention, this produces 
negative impacts on climate, harvest, health, social relations, and every other aspect of 
individual and/or collective lives in the local society.  
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